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I. INTRODUCTION
The first part of this article examined how new telephone information
technology has created commercial
opportunities for business and has enhanced information services for consumers through innovations in payper-call or audiotext ("900 number")
services. It also discussed how that
same technology has created new ways
to commit telemarketing fraud.
This second part of the article will
address the innovations of live and prerecorded autodialed calls and the business use of caller identification ("Caller
ID") services. These services, while
creating business opportunities, have
also decreased individual privacy
through the disclosure of telephone
numbers and the compilation of credit
records, buying patterns, and other
personal information in databases.
Further, these innovations have allowed
unsolicited telephone calls and fax
messages to disrupt life at home and the
office.
Public outcry has prompted federal
and state governments and their regulatory agencies to create new laws, to
enhance enforcement of existing laws,
and otherwise to address consumer concerns about fraud, privacy, and public
safety. For example, Congress recently enacted the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act of 1991,' which restricts unsolicited telemarketing calls
and prohibits some autodialed calls and
unsolicited faxes.
The recent regulations and legislation try to balance consumer expectations of privacy and freedom from
deception with the First Amendment

rights of businesses to use the technology to disseminate information for profit
and the First Amendment rights of
consumers willing to receive that information.
In discussing telemarketing calls that
use autodialing equipment and the business use of Caller ID, this article will
analyze statutes and regulations that
have been proposed and enacted to deal
with these business practices. Each
restriction also will be analyzed in
terms of balancing constitutional and
other rights. In particular, the article
will address the balance between the
First Amendment and consumers' rights
to privacy and freedom from deception
and fraud.
II. TELEMARKETING CALLS:
UNSOLICITED LIVE CALLS
AND AUTODIALED AND
PRERECORDED VOICE
MESSAGES
Telephone technology has enabled
salespeople to enter consumers' homes,
often without their consent or despite
their lack of consent. Live unsolicited
telemarketing calls are nothing new,
stemming from the 1930s and 1940s,
when war-era marketers had to adjust
to a decreased sales force.2 However,
computer technology has made it easier
to collect and use telephone numbers
and other consumer information, causing these calls to be more frequent and
pervasive in consumers' lives. The
Federal Communications Commission
("FCC")
studied
unsolicited
telemarketing calls in the early 1980s,
but it decided not to regulate them
because too few were interstate to jusLoyola Consumer Law Reporter
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tify the cost and the burden on First
Amendment free speech rights.' However, the revenues from goods and
services sold through telephone solicitations increased from more than $108
billion in 1984 to $435 billion in 1991.1
In particular, the advent of technology
enabling computers to dial consecutive
phone numbers and to transmit prerecorded sales messages has allowed
marketers to reach more consumers
than ever. While one live telemarketer
can make about 63 calls daily, one
automatic dialing system, or autodialer,
can deliver sales messages to 1,000
5
households in a day.
Although this technology presents
new and profitable opportunities for
legitimate businesses, such as 900 numbers, it also has allowed fraudulent
marketers to reach more victims. The
Alliance
Against
Fraud
in
Telemarketing, a coalition of consumer
groups, business associations, and government officials, estimates that consumers spend $15 billion yearly on
fraudulent telemarketing schemes .6For
example, the first national survey on
telemarketing fraud revealed that a single
telemarketing scheme defrauded about
fifty-four million Americans in 1992. 7
Typical fraudulent practices include
asking the caller to send money or to
disclose his or her credit card number
for bogus or low-quality products.
These scams are often targeted at vulnerable audiences, such as young people
or the elderly, who tend to be home
during the daytime.' Further, the
telemarketing fraud schemes often are
used with 900 numbers. For example,
consumers may receive an unsolicited
call telling them that they have won an
award and instructing them to call a
900 number to claim the prize or to
receive further information. The cost
of the call often exceeds the value of the
"prize." 9 This scheme can be particularly effective when prerecorded messages are used because the call recipient
cannot question the caller.
Although the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") and other regulatory
groups can deal effectively with frauduVolume 5 Number 4 / Summer 1993

lent telemarketing practices by enforcing current laws, many Americans feel
that even legitimate telemarketing calls
are still an invasion of privacy. The

SOne live telemarketer can
make about 63 calls daily;
one automatic dialing
system, or autodialer, can
deliver sales messages to
1,000 households in a day.

calls often are made at dinnertime or on
the weekend, times when consumers
are most likely to be at home. However, these are also times that many
people want to relax and "escape the
hurly-burly of the outside business and
political world."'" Even when consumers are not at home, many
autodialers leave prerecorded messages
on answering machines. They also
have been known to call pagers, which
often are used to receive only emergency calls. As a result, telemarketing
calls to pagers used for emergency calls
may prove traumatic for the recipient." These autodialing systems also
are used to send advertising messages
to fax machines, disrupting businesses
and wasting expensive fax paper.12
In addition, the calls may create
public safety problems. Because
autodialing systems dial telephone numbers consecutively, they can tie up
phone lines throughout a hospital, or at
a police or fire station. Some autodialers
do not disconnect immediately after
the caller hangs up, creating further
problems. For example, in one instance a mother could not call an ambulance for her injured child because the
line was tied up by a computer call that
would not disconnect until the message
was completed. 3
A. Regulation of Telemarketing
Calls
Concerns regarding telemarketing

calls were cited by the supporters of
legislation that Congress approved in
November 1991.14 The Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 ("TCPA")
restricts the use of unsolicited
telemarketing calls and prohibits most
autodialed calls and unsolicited faxes. 5
The first issue the legislation addresses
is the use of automated telephone equipment or autodialers. As of December
20, 1992, telemarketers are no longer
permitted to use autodialers or artificial or prerecorded voice messages to
transmit their sales messages. They are
prohibited from making autodialed calls
to hospitals, to emergency lines, to
paging services, to cellular phones, and
to private residences unless the resident
has given prior express consent. Exceptions to this prohibition are made
only for emergency purposes (e.g., to
notify residents of a power outage or
impending natural disaster), or if the
use is exempted by an FCC order. 6
Further, telemarketers cannot use such
devices to engage more than two lines
simultaneously in a business with multiple lines. 7 The TCPA also prohibits
the use of telephone fax machines to
send unsolicited advertisements. 8
The FCC was charged with responsibility for developing regulations to
implement the TCPA. Congress suggested that the FCC exempt calls that
did not adversely affect privacy rights
and that did not transmit unsolicited
advertisements." As promulgated, the
FCC regulations allow artificial or prerecorded voice calls to residential lines
if the calls are not for commercial
purposes,20 if the calls are commercial
but do not deliver unsolicited advertisements, 2' if the calls are to persons
"with whom the caller has an established business relationship, '22 or if the
call is made by a tax-exempt, nonprofit
organization. 2 Additional examples
of calls Congress intended to exclude
are calls transmitting information that
an ordered item is in stock or that a bill
is overdue24 and calls made by charities
or automatic message delivery services
that forward personal messages for individuals 5
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The TCPA allows a private right of
action to enjoin violations and to collect actual money damages or $500 per
violation, whichever is greater. Treble
damages are also allowed for willful,
knowing violations .26 Furthermore, a
state may bring a civil action against a
violator if the state believes the entity
has engaged in a pattern or practice of
violating the TCPA. 27 Every autodialed

Telemarketing calls maybe
restricted as long as the
government interest in
protecting telephone
subscriber privacyand public
safety is significant and the
means of restriction are
narrowly tailored.

or prerecorded voice message must
include the identity of the caller and its
phone number or address.28 Fax advertisements must also indicate the date,
time, sender's identity, and sender's
29
fax number on each page of the fax.
The second issue addressed by the
TCPA is unsolicited live telemarketing
calls. Congress suggested that the FCC
institute some type of single, national
database with a list of residential telephone subscribers who have expressed
their wish not to receive telephone
solicitations.30 This list would be sold
to telemarketers, who would be prohibited from calling listed persons.
However, after exploring ways to protect telephone subscribers' privacy
rights and to avoid objectionable telephone solicitations, the FCC decided
not to establish the national database.
Instead, the recently promulgated regulations require businesses to maintain
their own lists of persons who do not
wish to receive calls.3 The establishment of the no-call list requirement is
analogous to the speech cases in which
unwilling recipients have been permit-

I
ted to block speech without unduly
restricting the rights of the speaker.32
The TCPA was to take effect in December 1992, but a telemarketing group
recently obtained a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of the section
of the Act concerning prerecorded
messages to residences, pending determination of the Act's constitutional33
ity.
B. BalancingFirstAmendment
Protectionof Telemarketing
Messages With Consumer Privacy
Rights
The TCPA tries to balance privacy
rights and free speech interests "in such
a way that protects the privacy of individuals and permits legitimate
telemarketing practices. '34 The Act
restricts telephone solicitation initiated
to encourage "the purchase or rental of,
or investment in, property, goods, or
services, which is transmitted to any
person without that person's prior express invitation or permission. '3 As
was discussed in Part I of this article,
the strength of the government interest
necessary to justify the restriction on
speech depends on whether the regulation is content-neutral or content-based.
In the past, industry representatives
have argued that a similar bill proposing a "no-call" list was not contentneutral because it did not apply to
solicitations for votes, survey informa36
tion, or political or charitable funds.
The opponents argued that those types
of calls, if unsolicited, were no less
intrusive than unsolicited telemarketing
calls. However, the rule that commercial speech receives less First Amendment protection than other types of
speech
is
well-established.3 7
Telemarketing calls may be restricted
as long as the government interest in
protecting telephone subscriber privacy
and public safety is significant and the
means of restriction are narrowly tailored. The plaintiffs in Moser v. FCC
conceded that their messages were commercial speech and that, under Central
Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n,39 the government has a sub-

stantial interest in protecting citizens'
privacy. The question to be decided in
the case was whether a reasonable fit
existed between the means used and the
end of promoting consumer privacy. 4°
In issuing the preliminary injunction, the Moser court relied on the
Sixth Circuit opinion in DiscoveryNetwork, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati.4 In
that case, the court overturned a Cincinnati ordinance that would have eliminated newsracks belonging to commercial handbill distributors without restricting newsracks belonging to newspapers such as the Cincinnati Post,
USA Today, and The Wall Street Journal. The court held that the ban on the
commercial newsracks was an excessive means to accomplish the stated
aesthetic and safety end urged by the
city. The court suggested that lesser
restrictions, including bolting the racks
to the sidewalk, or rationing the total
number of racks, might pass muster.
While the case may have the correct
factual result, the opinion ignored the
distinction between the newspapers
(which have additional constitutional
rights) and commercial vendors.42 The
Discovery Network opinion also seems
to have ignored the line of cases that
permit reasonable restrictions on time,
place, and manner of speech.43 The
aesthetic and supposed safety interests
proposed as reasons for restricting
newsracks on public streets also seem
less substantial than the privacy interests people have when in their own
homes.
The United States Constitution does
not explicitly provide for an
individual's right to privacy, but an
implied right has been acknowledged
by the Supreme Court in specific applications under the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause."
However, the Fourteenth Amendment
only prevents restriction of constitutional rights by the state, not by private
action.45 The constitutional right to
privacy is not invoked in telemarketing
cases because the right applies only to
intrusions by the government, not those
by private businesses and individuals.
Loyola Consumer Law Reporter
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However, the state has a legitimate
interest in "protecting its citizens against
the practices deemed subversive of privacy and of quiet." 46 "'The police
power of a state extends beyond health,
morals and safety, and comprehends
the duty, within constitutional limitations, to protect the well-being and
47
tranquility of a community.'
In fact, a disgruntled telemarketing
"victim" formed a consumer group
called Private Citizen, Inc. to combat
unwanted telemarketing calls. The
organization's founder sends notices to
more than 1,000 telemarketing companies that includes a list of the
organization's paid members' names
and a letter trying to establish a contract "selling" the members' privacy
rights for a fee. 4 8 The letter notifies the
telemarketers that the listed consumers
are not willing to accept any unsolicited
calls from the marketer; however, the
members will accept calls for $100 per
call, due within thirty days. The letter
further states that the telemarketing
call will constitute the telemarketer's
agreement to accept the members'
terms. It is uncertain whether the letter
establishes a legally enforceable contract, but members have reported that
the amount of telemarketing calls they
received dropped 75 percent after joining the group. In addition, some companies have actually sent some members $100 after calling them. The letter
now serves as a basis for a lawsuit
a
against a telemarketer who called
4
member after receiving the letter. 1
The state's interest in protecting its
citizens' privacy may justify restrictions on an activity threatening that
privacy. For example, the Supreme
Court has upheld restrictions on the use
of sound trucks in public streets50 and
on
allowed limitations
has
nonconsensual door-to-door solicitations." The strength of the privacy
interests in such instances depends upon
two factors: the forum where the speech
is received and the nature of the communication. 2 Privacy rights are greatest at home but less strong in public
places, including the office.5" Further,
Volume 5 Number 4 / Summer 1993

oral communications are more intrusive than visual ones because it is more
difficult to turn away and block them
out.' Thus, telephone messages received at home are more invasive of
privacy rights than mail, television
messages, or telephone messages received at the office. Most existing

Oral communications are more
intrusive than visual ones
because it is more difficult to
turn away and block them out.
Thus, telephone messages
received at home are more
invasive of privacy rights than
mail, television messages, or
telephone messages received in
the office.

regulations concerning telephone messages exclude solicited calls because
they do not disturb a person's privacy. A call may be expressly solicited by a consumer's request or it may
be implicitly solicited when it offers
"information directly relat[ed] to a prior
transaction of the party called and of
56
apparent interest to that party.
The government is constitutionally
permitted to restrict commercial speech,
and commercial telemarketing calls and
faxes obviously fall within this category of speech. Thus, any restriction
need only directly advance the government interest in protecting its citizens'
privacy and public safety in a narrowly
tailored manner. 57 State regulations of
autodialer use have passed constitutional scrutiny. For example, the Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld, against
a First Amendment challenge, a Minnesota law that prohibited the use of
autodialers unless the autodialed call
was introduced by a live operator.5"
Applying the Central Hudson test, the
court found the law was narrowly tailored to promote the state's substantial
interest in protecting its citizens' privacy and in preventing fraudulent or

misleading telephone practices. 9
The Supreme Court has found that
safeguarding community peace and
order is a significant government interest. 6° Because the TCPA does not
prohibit unsolicited telemarketing calls
outright, but instead requires the express prior consent of the call recipient,
the regulation is not too extensive.
Willing recipients will not be deprived
of the ability to receive the speech,
while unwilling individuals will not be
subject to unnecessary intrusions into
their private residences. Further,
telemarketers could benefit from the
TCPA because it requires them to establish a list of consumers who are not
interested in receiving the advertiser's
information, saving the advertiser the
expense and time of calling those
people. 61 While the FCC regulations
under the TCPA require that consent be
"prior express consent," they do not
explicitly clarify what this entails. Thus,
telemarketers still may make commercial calls using artificial or prerecorded
voices to residences if they are not
62
advertisements.
unsolicited
Unsolicited advertisements are defined
as those delivered without the
individual's "prior express invitation
or permission. '63 Further, telemarketers
may make such calls to consumers with
whom they have an "established business relationship."' Telemarketers may
interpret certain consumer actions, such
as a previous inquiry or purchase, as
giving express consent or as establishing a business relationship. For example, a 900-number service with
Caller ID capabilities could record the
number of a caller and later use it to
solicit that caller by phone, interpreting the original call as consent for
future calls.65
III. CALLER ID - USE BY
TELEMARKETERS TO GATHER
AND DISSEMINATE
CONSUMER INFORMATION
WITHOUT EXPRESS CONSENT
Caller ID is another technological
advance that has caused consumer concern. New telephone switching sys107
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tems allow local telephone companies
to transmit information other than voice
signals. In particular, telephone companies may transmit telephone numbers. As a result, Caller ID services
have been developed to display the
telephone number of the calling party
to the called party.' Caller ID has been
the subject of considerable controversy
because of its impact on callers' privacy rights. A full discussion of the
controversy is beyond the scope of this
article. Generally, though, proponents
argue that the service allows telephone
customers to screen phone calls and to
avoid unwanted or harassing ones, while
opponents argue that callers no longer
would be able to control disclosure of
their telephone numbers and the subsequent use of their number by the people
they called. 67 In particular, consumers
are concerned that businesses can use
Caller ID to gather and disseminate
information about consumers, possibly
68
without their consent or knowledge.
Although in the past a phone number
may not have revealed much information about people, except perhaps where
they lived, vast databases now exist that
link phone numbers with other personal information, such as buying hab69
its and credit records.
Caller ID is useful when consumers
call a business for information, such as
the status of a purchase order. Caller
ID allows the operator to retrieve the
consumer's record without lengthy inquiries by the operator. This decreases
costs for the business and speeds up the
70
transaction for the consumer.
However, Caller ID also allows the
possibility of creating marketing lists
that can be cross-referenced with demographic information. Such lists can
be sold subsequently to other marketers
with whom the consumer has never had
contact.7 In particular, 900-number
services often use this technology to
compile information about their customers. For example, American Telephone & Telegraph offers a special
Caller ID service just for 800- and 900number services.72
Obtaining lists of potential custom-

ers is the key to any telemarketing
effort.73 Typically, such lists are compiled by a company for its own use,
based on customers with whom they
have had past dealings. However, such
lists also are compiled, and then sold,
by companies who base the lists on
either information in public records or
information they have gathered about
their own customers.74 Although the
technology arguably is helpful when
used by airlines or credit card companies to enhance customer service and to
contact willing customers, it could allow the dissemination of private information if used by "adult" or other 900number services. Further, use of a
caller's phone number by any 900number service without the caller's
consent or knowledge is an invasion of
the caller's privacy.
A. Regulation of Caller ID
Congress has proposed several bills
to restrict the use of Caller ID systems,
but none have been passed yet because
of the debate between those who think
the service is useful to deter harassing
phone calls and those who think the
service invades the caller's privacy.75
For example, the proposed Telephone
Privacy Act, opposed by the Bush Administration, would have restricted
marketers seeking to reuse or sell information obtained through Caller ID services. 76 Various blocking services often are suggested as an addition to
Caller ID, allowing consumers the option of blocking the identification of
their phone numbers when they place a
call. However, telephone companies
are not yet able to use blocking technology on calls to 700, 800, and 900
numbers. 77 Meanwhile, the provision
of Caller ID service is being adopted or
7
rejected on a state-by-state basis.
B. Consumer Right to Privacy and
CallerID
When examining Caller ID regulations, one first must determine whether
the actions of telephone companies,
which are heavily regulated public utilities, can be deemed to be state actions

subject to constitutional limitations.
Because telephone companies offer and
implement the Caller ID equipment
and service, they are effectively the
parties revealing possibly private information. Telephone company actions are arguably state actions because
government agencies and public utility
or service commissions must approve
them.79 However, in Jackson v. Metro.
Edison Co.," the Supreme Court found
that a "sufficiently close nexus" must
exist "between the State and the challenged action of the regulated entity" to
treat "the action of the latter.., as that
of the State itself."'" Furthermore, "the
nature of governmental regulation of
private utilities is such that a utility
may frequently be required by the state
regulatory scheme to obtain approval
for practices a business regulated in less
detail would be free to institute without
any approval from a regulatory body.
Approval by a state utility commission
... where the commission has not put
its own weight on the side of the proposed practice by ordering it, does not
transmute [the] practice.., into 'state
action.' "'
Usually, a state can be held responsible for a private action only if it has
coerced or significantly encouraged,
either overtly or covertly, such an action.82
No court has decided whether the
disclosure of a telephone number by a
telephone company through Caller ID
technology violates a constitutionally
protected right to privacy. 3 However,
the courts have analyzed other telephone company activities and the companies' relationships with the states.
For example, a telephone company's
refusal to provide billing services to a
dial-a-porn service was found to be
state action when the state public utility
commission ("PUC") worked closely
with the company in developing legislation it had proposed and in developing its tariff settlement (statement of
utility's rates, terms, and conditions),84
Although the legislation specified that
the PUC would not have jurisdiction
over the company's billing decisions
Loyola Consumer Law Reporter
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concerning 900 number providers, the
PUC helped the phone company finetune the bill the phone company had
proposed to "'clarify [the company's]
intent of specifically attacking dial-aporn providers.'" 8 6 In other words, by
removing the billing decision from
explicit state scrutiny, the parties were
hoping to avoid constitutional challenges such as the one raised in the case.
Also, the PUC assured that the tariff
was not to apply to billing "'services
which contain harmful matter.' "87
The court determined that these actions evidenced a close nexus between
the telephone company and the state,
such that the company's actions could
be attributed to the state and, therefore,
subject to First Amendment scrutiny.
The court came to this conclusion by
considering five factors identified by
the United States Supreme Court as
important in state action determinations: (1) the statute's effect; (2) the
statute's objective; (3) the statute's
context; (4) the amount of interaction
between the state and the private party;
and (5) "the existence of a state-created
framework" allowing the private party's
action."8 Under the Jackson definition
and this test, if a state utility commission merely approved the telephone
company's offering of Caller ID, the
phone companies' action would not be
deemed state action.
Putting aside the question of whether
the utility's action is state action, the
disclosure of a phone number may not
even be an invasion of privacy. 9 Is a
telephone number personal enough to
give rise to state protection? Fourth
Amendment search and seizure cases
that have considered the government's
gathering of information through a
person's telephone use provide an analogy. The Supreme Court has found
that a telephone user has no reasonable
expectation of privacy as to the numbers that they call. 9' Under Fourth
Amendment analysis, courts must consider whether an individual had an
actual expectation of privacy and
whether that expectation was reasonable according to society's standards.9
Volume 5 Number 4/Summer 1993

The Court reasoned that because callers
know the telephone numbers that they
call are transmitted to the telephone
company and recorded for legitimate
business purposes, it was "too much to
believe that telephone subscribers...
harbor any general expectation that the
numbers they dial will remain secret."92
However, in his dissent, Justice Stewart

Is a telephone number
personal enough to give
rise to state protection?
... Under Fourth
Amendment analysis,
courts must consider
whether an individual
had an actual
expectation of privacy
and whether that
expectation was
reasonable according to
society's standards.

argued that "[t]he numbers dialed from
a private telephone - although certainly more prosaic than the conversation itself - are not without 'content."' Telephone numbers "easily...
[identify] ... the persons and the places
called, and thus reveal the most intimate details of a person's life."92 Consider also the fact that, in a 1992 survey, 76 percent of consumers felt they
had lost complete control over how
personal information about them is
being disseminated and used by busi4
nesses.
The types of information protected
as private under governmental freedom of information acts provide another analogy. The federal Freedom of
Information Act provides that all persons have the right to inspect any records
maintained by a public agency. 95 However, the Act does except, among other
things, personnel or other files, "the
disclosure of which would constitute a
clearly unwarranted invasion of per-

sonal privacy." 96 The Connecticut Supreme Court, for one, has determined
that disclosure of a person's address
would not constitute an invasion of
personal privacy.97 The court did conclude, however, that if the individuals
affected had made significant efforts to
shield their addresses from the public,
their addresses would have fallen under
the exception.98 The court relied on the
fact that addresses are publicly available: they are known by friends, published in public telephone directories,
and released by mail order businesses
to advertisers. 9 Telephone numbers
are likewise publicly available unless a
consumer makes an effort to have the
number unlisted, withholds it from all
but close friends, or refuses to disclose
it to commercial entities with which he
or she deals. Further, disclosing one's
telephone number to telemarketers
would not cause embarrassment or
harm, unlike the arguable embarrassment or harm which may result if the
number is revealed when one calls an
organization such as a suicide hotline
or a rape crisis center." °
IV. CONCLUSION
The United States has more telephones than any other country in the
world. 10 1 Thus it is not surprising that
business and high technology have combined to create a multi-billion dollar
telemarketing industry. Advances in
telephone and information technology
in conjunction with the deregulation of
many American telephone companies
have helped the telemarketing industry. Autodialing technology enables
marketers to rapidly dial consumers'
numbers and transmit prerecorded advertising messages at a far greater rate
than a human caller. While the marketers have gained, consumers have lost
privacy in their homes due to a barrage
of marketing calls at inconvenient hours
by impersonal computer recordings.
For this reason, the federal government
has enacted legislation that restricts the
use of autodialers by telemarketers in
order to protect consumers' privacy.
Although this privacy is not constitu109
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tionally guaranteed, the government
does have the ability to ensure the peace
of its citizens in their private residences. However, the legislation had
to be narrowly tailored to avoid violating telemarketers' First Amendment
rights.
Before marketers can even make
these calls, they must obtain information about consumers, including their
phone numbers. Once again technology has stepped in: Caller ID services
have enabled businesses to gather and
disseminate, without the consumers'
consent or knowledge, information
about consumers who call them. Thus,
consumers have become concerned that
Caller ID invades the privacy they have
in personal information, in particular,
their phone numbers. Although the
federal government has not yet enacted
any law to protect consumers in this
area, several restrictions have been proposed. Like regulation of other
telemarketing practices, Caller ID legislation may be justified to protect
consumer privacy. However, a telephone company's creation of Caller ID
services is probably not state action
such that the constitution guarantees
the consumer a right to privacy. Thus,
it will be necessary to establish that a
telephone number is private information.
The new telephone technology creates many opportunities for information dissemination and collection. With
the new opportunities come inherent
conflicts which must be carefully resolved. The challenge remains to balance the legitimate business opportunities involved in the use of information
and the rights of citizens to receive such
information, with legitimate concerns
about privacy and freedom from deception. *-
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